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At the level of theory, the effect of collective bargaining on innovation is disputed. The large 
proponderance of the U.S. evidence clearly points to adverse effects, but other-country 
experience suggests that certain industrial relations systems, or the wider regulatory 
apparatus, might even tip the balance in favor of unions. Our pooled cross section and 
difference-in-differences estimates provide some weak evidence that German collective 
bargaining inhibits innovation. However, in conjunction with workplace representation, there 
is the suggestion that it might actually foster innovative activity. 
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Introduction 
The topic of collective bargaining and investment in intangible (and tangible) capital 
has been the subject of considerable controversy for a number of years now. The debate 
remains unsettled, although theory has tended to look with more favor upon the union entity 
if it is located in an “appropriate” institutional setting. Theory has in one sense been 
channeled in this direction by empirical research pointing to a sharp dichotomy between 
North American findings that are almost invariably negative in respect of the union impact on 
innovation capital and European research that generally points to an absence of significant 
associations once one proceeds much beyond the raw correlations in the data.  
In the present paper, we focus on the innovative activities of German establishments 
over the six-year observation window, 2007–2012. Our measure of innovation is the actual 
(or successful) introduction of some product or process innovation (although we shall also 
investigate failure to innovate). Apart from allowing us to consider a new output indicator, our 
choice of Germany was predicated on that nation’s unique structure of cooperative industrial 
relations, early research seeming to offer some confirmation of the benefits of cooperation 
provided the level of union density is not “excessive.” 
We use both extensive descriptive analysis and regression techniques to evaluate the 
role of different institutional arrangements on innovation, while controlling for a wide array of 
establishment-level observables. We also tackle unobserved establishment heterogeneity by 
constructing different establishment subsamples and then investigating differences in 
changes in the incidence of innovation using appropriate comparison groups of innovating 
and non-innovating establishments in combination with collective bargaining (and works 
council) switchers and collective bargaining stayers in a difference-in-differences framework. 
This approach to isolating the causal effect of labor institutions, using changes in collective 
bargaining status as the main identification vehicle, is new in this literature. (For another 
approach, see the discussion of Bradley, Kim, and Tian, 2014, below.)  
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we provide a comprehensive statement 
of the theory of collective bargaining/unionism and innovation with a view to justifying 
consideration of the German case, while deriving a set of more targeted hypotheses related 
to that nation. Second, we examine the empirical evidence on innovation, with the goal of 
drawing a distinction between the North American evidence and the rest before examining a 
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still sparse extant German literature by way of scene-setting. Third, we review the unique 
dataset used in this inquiry and introduce the key innovation measures and explanatory 
variables. Fourth, we present a set of descriptive results on the frequency and continuity of 
the different types of innovative activity and describe the unconditional and conditional (on 
union/worker representation) probabilities of an establishment having a particular type of 
innovation. Fifth, our detailed cet. par. results are presented, together with robustness 
checks. A summary concludes, the burden of which is that German collective bargaining is not 
generally to be construed as inhibiting innovation and may indeed prove beneficial when 
accompanied by workplace codetermination. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
Theory suggests that collective bargaining can have positive as well as negative effects 
on innovation. In the traditional model, the union-set wage is represented as an exogenous 
change in the price of labor, the firm in response adjusting employment along its labor 
demand curve. In this case, the union premium or tax is levied on labor. Union firms duly 
substitute away from expensive labor. The net effect is unclear. It depends on the degree of 
substitutability between capital and labor and the magnitude of the scale effect as the 
premium filters through into higher product prices and output falls. 
By contrast, the more modern view is that unions tax capital, that firms respond 
unambiguously by cutting tangible and intangible capital investments, and that the wage is 
endogenous. The idea is that unions expropriate part of the quasi-rents that form part of the 
normal (i.e. competitive) returns to capital but which are vulnerable to capture once 
investment in specialized plant and equipment and R&D has been made. We note 
parenthetically that R&D expenditures have been used in the literature as a key indicator of 
the asset specificity of an investment (see Cavanaugh, 1989). Familiarly, such assets will 
continue in use as long they earn a return above their alternative use; the more specific the 
asset, the bigger the scope for union rent seeking. Of course, with the relation-specific capital 
in situ, higher wages are unlikely to influence the use of the asset, but firms will anticipate 
reduced returns to such capital and invest less. 
This is the so-called “hold-up” problem, first analyzed by Grout (1984). In the  simple 
one shot two-stage game summarized by Menezes-Filho and van Reenen (2003, p. 296), the 
firm first chooses a level of capital (either high or low) and in the next round the union 
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chooses the wage (high/low). By backward induction, the union will always choose a high 
wage in the second stage and, knowing this, the firm will always choose a low investment 
strategy at the first stage. Further, the union tax on investment will vary directly with the 
specificity of the asset and its longevity. The tax would vanish were the union able to commit 
itself to a low wage strategy by posting a bond or hostage to a third party, or where there is 
bargaining over investment as well as wages.1  
However, collective bargaining is repeated over time rather than being a one-shot 
exercise and, abstracting from an end-game scenario (Lawrence and Lawrence, 1985), 
repeated games offer a solution to the hold-up problem since opportunistic behavior can in 
principle be appropriately punished (e.g. van der Ploeg, 1987). An important issue in the 
literature has been the degree to which unions discount the future. In particular, it has been 
argued that because union members do not have property rights in the union they will be 
rationally myopic and discount the future at a higher rate than shareholders. And this 
tendency will be reinforced by the greater influence of older workers in union councils (Hirsch 
and Prasad, 1995). Accordingly, much hinges in a repeated game context on the union’s 
discount factor2 and the success of firms in extending the union’s horizon (including greater 
recourse to debt), as well as inefficient defensive strategies such as the maintenance of 
inefficient capital or plants to facilitate substantial cuts in employment as a short-run profit-
maximizing response to wage demands (for a discussion, see Baldwin, 1983). 
There remains a strong presumption in the unions-and-investment literature, 
therefore, that greater worker representation will depress investments in physical and 
intangible capital – the Grout result – and will be accompanied by second-best responses. 
Abstracting from the related possibility that union firms might license out innovations rather 
than develop them in house – which might lead to no difference in patenting as between 
union and nonunion regimes – a number of theoretical caveats and new developments have 
also to be recognized.  
First, the hold-up model ignores the strategic component of innovative activity.  The 
argument here is that much R&D is conducted by large firms that operate in oligopolistic 
industries. Menezes-Filho and van Reenen (2003, p. 299) argue that this strategic interaction 
undermines the analytical clarity of the Grout result. Drawing on Ulph and Ulph’s (1994, 
2001) patent race model, they illustrate the circumstances in which stronger unions can 
actually increase R&D spending.3 
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Second, unions can help the adoption and spread of new techniques by articulating  
workers’ “collective voice” (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The labor market context is 
important here: it is (largely) one of continuity rather than spot market contracting because 
of on-the-job skills specific to the firm and the costs attaching to worker mobility and 
turnover. Collective bargaining may be more effective than individual bargaining in 
overcoming workplace public goods problems and attendant free-rider problems. As the 
workers’ agent, unions may facilitate the exercise of the workers’ right to free speech, acquire 
information, monitor employee behavior, and formalize the workplace governance structure 
(see below) in such a way that better represents average workers who are more skilled. Given 
an appropriate response by management and a cooperative industrial relations environment, 
greater training, lower turnover, and better morale can help the adoption and spread of new 
techniques. As noted by Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (1998: 46), if the innovations 
generated by R&D are adopted by the firm or if one of the purposes of R&D is to facilitate the 
capture of spillovers from other firms (referred to as “absorptive capacity”), then unions will 
affect the costs of implementation and have an indirect effect on the price of investing in 
R&D. Absorption will also be reflected in the innovation embedded in new plant and 
equipment. But there are no guarantees, and the union rule book and poor industrial 
relations could slow down technological adoption.  
Third, and relatedly, unionism can facilitate efficient contracting in situations where 
there is a long-term relation between the two sides but where employer’s ex ante promises 
to take workers’ interests into account are not credible or where the reputation effects 
mechanism is weak. This characterization of the union as a commitment device was first 
advanced by Malcomson (1983). For their part, Freeman (1976, p. 364) and Freeman and 
Medoff (1984, p. 11) argue that the union governance apparatus of the collective voice model 
sketched above is quite consistent with the modern contracts literature, not least in 
addressing the possibility that the hold-up problem might also apply to the capture of the 
sunk investments of workers by the employer, leading to under-investment in human capital. 
Thus, the presence of a union specializing in information about the contract and in the 
representation of workers can prevent employers from engaging in opportunistic behavior. 
Further, workers may withhold effort and cooperation when the employer cannot credibly 
commit to take their interests into account. The formation of a union and the introduction of 
a system of industrial jurisprudence is one way of protecting the employees. That said, there 
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is a downside: the threat of credible punishment implies bargaining power, the expression of 
which can undermine the union voice solution to the governance (and informational) 
problems of continuity markets.  
We will next proceed to look at more specific institutional arrangements that might be 
expected to influence the impact of unionism on innovation.4 We consider in turn the role of 
different collective bargaining structures and the laws governing the employment relation as 
possible offsets to unfavorable union or firm effects on innovation. Beginning with collective 
bargaining structures, the most relevant analysis is that of Haucap and Wey (2004), whose 
framework is that of a unionized oligopoly model with two firms that are engaged in a patent 
race for an innovation that lowers the labor required per unit of output (i.e. a process 
innovation). Innovation provides the only route for achieving a competitive edge in this 
setting. With the introduction of a process innovation, the investment cost of the innovation 
is sunk and labor’s productivity rises. The size of the (specific) investment cost indexes the 
scale of the hold-up problem confronted by the firm under unionization. The setting is a 
three-stage game in which a wage-bill-maximizing union sets the wage and the firm the level 
of employment, and where the firms compete in Cournot fashion in the product market.  
But now the specific type of collective bargaining emerges as a crucial determinant of 
the firms’ investment incentives. Haucap and Wey distinguish between three modes of 
unionism: decentralized, coordinated, and centralized. Decentralized bargaining is where 
there are two separate firm-level unions that set wages independently and non-
cooperatively. Coordination refers to a situation where a common, industry union sets wages 
separately for the two firms so as to maximize the industry wage bill. Finally, centralization 
refers to a common union that sets a single uniform wage standard for the two firms, again so 
as to maximize the industry wage bill. The model shows that firms’ incentives to innovate are 
largest under centralization and smallest under coordination. This is because coordination 
permits the monopoly union to exploit its hold-up potential fully by setting discriminatory 
wages, while the other two union types constrain union power. Under centralization since 
wages are set according to average productivity, once a firm innovates industry productivity 
will rise and along with it the wage. But the wage rises less than the productivity secured by 
the innovation at firm level and the innovating firm will not therefore lose the entire surplus 
generated. Contrast this situation with coordination, where the firm will lose all the gains of a 
cost-reducing innovation since the wage will rise pari passu with productivity. Finally, under 
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decentralization, the union of the now less efficient firm makes wage concessions to restore 
that firm’s competitiveness. From this  perspective, sectoral bargaining in Germany – 
centralized bargaining in the language of the model – offers a marginally more favorable 
regime for (process) innovation than the more decentralized United States.  
Another recent institutional application builds on employer hold-up of innovating 
employees – rather than the more standard worker training investments. Acharya, Baghai, 
and Subramanian (2012) specify a game in which the employer first recruits an employee and 
chooses to invest in either an innovative or a routine project in period 0, each requiring the 
same initial investment and generating cash flow at t=2. At t=1 the employee invests firm-
specific effort which affects the innovative project outcome. This effort is observable but not 
verifiable ex ante. At time t=1.5 each party learns whether or not the project yielded an 
innovation. If the employee has invested sufficient effort, it does. Familiarly, the model rules 
out the possibility of complete contracts at t=0 so that at point t=1.5, after the employee has 
made the firm-specific effort and it is known that the project has generated a successful 
innovation, that individual is exposed to the possibility of hold-up. The employer can threaten 
to fire the employee to reduce the employee’s bargaining power. And the innovating 
employee may take steps to hold on to bargaining power, prompting the employer to replace 
him or her with new employees.   
At this stage, the authors introduce a wrongful discharge law that allows the fired 
employee legal recourse in the event that the innovation was successful. Even though the 
commitment problem is not eradicated, the law lowers the probability of employer 
malfeasance and increases employees’ innovative efforts, thereby encouraging firms to invest 
in innovative projects. Given its more encompassing dismissals protection, Germany (and 
some U.S. states) would again appear better protected from this form of hold-up than the 
United States (other U.S. states).   
If the above institutional characteritics modify the standard hold-up analysis in 
potentially important ways, there is a specific German worker representation agency that also 
needs to be addressed at this point, namely the works council, or Betriebsrat. The works 
council is the second component of that nation’s dual system of industrial relations – the first 
being the system of sectoral collective bargaining.5 Given their location at the workplace and 
restricted bargaining rights, works councils are in principle an exemplary voice institution. 
Indeed, Freeman and Lazear (1995) contend that the machinery of the works council holds 
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out the prospect of an improvement in the joint surplus of the enterprise because of that 
body’s unique information, consultation, and participation/co-determination rights. Having 
access to information that can verify management claims, the works council can render them 
credible to the workforce and preempt retaliatory behavior, resulting in increased effort 
flexibility. For its part, consultation allows new solutions to production and other workplace 
problems by virtue of the non-overlapping information sets of the two sides and the creativity 
of discussion. Finally, participation or co-determination rights generate an improvement in 
the joint surplus by providing workers with greater security, encouraging them to take a 
longer-run view of the prospects of the firm. The issue of the time horizon of workers is it will 
be recalled an important consideration in investment models. 
Freeman and Lazear nevertheless argue that workers may be expected to demand too 
much involvement because their share in the joint surplus of the enterprise will continue to 
rise after that surplus has peaked. Accordingly, firms will either resist works councils or vest 
them with insufficient power. It is at this point that the wider industrial relations/legal context 
in which the German works council is embedded commends itself to Freeman and Lazear 
because of the limits placed on their rent seeking. In particular, works councils cannot call a 
strike nor can they (without authorization) negotiate terms that are settled or normally 
settled by collective agreements at sectoral level. At issue, is whether there is a sufficient 
decoupling of production from distribution issues in practice, with some theory and empirical 
research (e.g. Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003) suggesting that the discipline of an industry 
agreement makes this more likely. This argument also addresses the ambiguity concerning 
union strength, it being acknowledged that U.S. unions are weaker than their European 
counterparts.  
In the light of the above, there are grounds for believing that the German model may 
be more favorable to innovation than the North American model, despite unionism being 
more powerful. To be sure it is unclear whether the dominant form of collective bargaining in 
Germany is intrinsically beneficial/benign or whether its negative/redistributive effects are 
mitigated by other institutional arrangements such as a more regulated labor market and 
dismissals protection (Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2013). But set within the context of the dual 
model, there are grounds for expecting a potentially more positive impact of collective 
bargaining through the expression of collective voice.  
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
The Empirical Literature 
In what follows, we examine the empirical literature on unions and innovation, 
excluding results for tangible capital other than in passing. We begin with a brief summary of 
a major cross-country review that also examines some early German studies. Next, we 
investigate the most recent U.S. evidence, drawing on two state-of-the-art studies. Finally, we 
investigate the still sparse modern German literature.  A modified set of implications for our 
own study concludes. 
 
Cross-Country Evidence. In a review of some 31 national studies, Menezes-Filho and 
van Reenen (2003) examine the impact of unionism on R&D intensity (14 studies), the output 
of R&D/head count of measures of innovation (5 studies), and technology diffusion/the 
adoption of technology (12 studies).6 The clearest results are for R&D intensity. The North 
American studies all point towards strongly negative effects of unions on R&D intensity, 
whereas the European studies suggest either insignificant effects or material non-linearities. 
For example two German studies by Schnabel and Wagner report no effect of union density 
at industry level (1992a) but a positive effect at firm level providing union density is not too 
high (1994). Second, studies examining the impact of union power on counts of innovations 
are sparse (but see below) and point in Anglo-Saxon countries to negative but not always 
significant effects. The only early German study by Schnabel and Wagner (1992b) indicates 
positive but insignificant effects of unions (actually, works councils). Third, altogether more 
numerous are investigations of unions and technological diffusion but now the findings for 
the almost exclusively Anglo-Saxon national studies vary widely. That said, positive raw 
correlations between unionism and diffusion usually become insignificant when other 
arguments such as wages and training enter the set of covariates. The sole other-country 
study cited in the survey reports a negative and significant effect of German unionism – 
strictly ‘organized labor,’ namely union density interacted with works council presence – on 
the proportion of sales accounted for by products introduced within the previous 5 years 
(FitzRoy and Kraft, 1990).7   
 
Recent U.S. Studies. Two studies not included in extant cross-country studies are those 
of Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012) and Bradley, Kim, and Tian (2013) for the United 
10 
 
 
 
States. From the previous section it will be recalled that Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian 
argue that wrongful discharge laws spur innovation in circumstances where the employer and 
the employee cannot commit to a contract that prohibits either of them from acting in bad 
faith ex post. The model is tested using patent and financial data on 5,698 U.S. firms, 1971-
1999. The authors examine the role of most important exception to the U.S. common law 
hire-at-will principle, namely the “good faith exception,” which applies when a court 
determines that an employer has discharged an employee in bad faith.  The base outcome 
indicators are the number of patents granted and the number of citations to patents. The 
empirical model examines the before-and-after effect of a change in the law recognizing the 
good faith exception on innovative activity in affected states versus the before-and-after 
effect in states where no such change was introduced. The authors report firstly that the 
adoption of the good faith clause led to an increase in the annual number of patents 
(citations) of 12.2 (18.8) percent vis-à-vis firms in states which did not pass this law. Secondly, 
innovative effort as measured by patents (citations) scaled by the number of employees, or by 
R&D expenditure, increased materially with the adoption of the good faith exception.  Finally, 
the impact of the good faith exception was much stronger in innovation-intensive industries.8   
The above study does not look at unions. The latest technique employed in seeking 
unbiased estimates of the effects of unions on innovation (here patenting activity) has 
exploited regression discontinuity methods, comparing the innovation output of firms in 
which unions win representation elections by a small margin of votes with that of firms in 
which the vote is lost by a small margin. The maintained hypothesis is that in such close-call 
elections, union success approximates an independent random event, unlikely to be 
contaminated by unobserved firm heterogeneity. In deploying this regression discontinuity 
design, Bradley, Kim, and Tian (2013) use NLRB union election result data, 1980-2002, 
matched to innovation data from the NBER Patent Citation database. Two measures of 
innovation are constructed, namely patent quantity and patent quality. Patent quantity is the 
firm’s total number of patent applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted. 
Patent quality is the count of non-self citations received by each patent in subsequent year. 
The long-term nature of the innovation process is captured by relating data on labor unions 
and other characteristics in the current year to the innovation measures some one, two, and 
three years subsequent to the election result. A clear discontinuity in patent outcomes is 
detected at the threshold in each of the three years following elections. Specifically, the 
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authors’ preferred regression discontinuity design results, using a local linear estimation 
technique, indicate declines in innovation output of 8.7 per cent in the case of patent 
quantity and 12.5 percent, in patent quality in the wake of election victories.9  
The authors interpret their results as consistent with misaligned incentives produced 
by incomplete contracting and the hold-up problem, enhanced shirking as a result of greater 
protection against dismissals in union regimes leading directly to lower worker productivity, 
and negative selection among union workers attendant upon wage compression. The conflict 
with the Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian study might be reconciled if wrongful discharge is 
a low intensity form of employee protection and union representation as high intensity 
employee protection.  
 
Recent German Innovation Studies. Studies investigating the effect of German works 
councils – codetermination at the plant level10  – have proliferated in recent years and vastly 
outnumber studies of the effect of collective bargaining proper. But innovation studies are 
sparse. The early literature involved small company samples and is not further reviewed here.  
In the first study using a large sample of manufacturing establishments (N=1,025) in Lower 
Saxony in 1994, Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (2001) report an absence of association 
between the works council dummy and their two measures of innovative activity, namely 
whether or not the establishment introduced a new product or a new process in the previous 
year (see also Addison , Schnabel, and Wagner, 1996). Unfortunately, although the quality of 
the survey material is generally high, this is not the case for workplace union density where 
the imprecision of survey responses was too severe to exploit this question.    
Subsequent innovation studies point to a generally favorable view of the works council 
entity. Canter, Gerstlberger, and Roy (2014) consider the role of human capital/training as an 
input into technological innovation. The authors distinguish between general and firm-specific 
capital in influencing innovation and the role of collective bargaining and worker 
representation in their provision. It is argued that general human capital – taken to include 
such things as training for improving teamwork and communication and training related to 
problem-solving skills (and hence much closer to human resource management practices than 
to Becker’s vision of general training) – has a low priority for the firm but a high priority for 
the works council. On the other hand, firm-specific human capital – identified with training in 
machine operations and technical instruction – is held to be of key concern to employers but 
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of less interest to works councils since it applies to a subset of the labor force while they are 
representative of the entire workforce.  The prediction is that general training but not specific 
training will be positively correlated with works council presence, while firms will undertake 
firm-specific training to improve the knowledge base that is required to be successful in 
innovation. The link between general training and innovation performance is not expected to 
be strong but its breadth is predicted to improve the absorptive capacities of the firm. This 
leads the authors to distinguish between incremental and radical innovation. It is argued that 
the former is likely to be facilitated by both types of training, while the latter should be more 
influenced by firm-specific training as this type of innovation requires a strong technical 
knowledge base of the employees.   
Using data from a representative sample of German establishments in 2011 (n=256), 
the authors construct index measures of the intensity of the two types of training (plus an 
aggregate index of total training) and binary measures of incremental and radical innovation. 
Among the controls for firm-level and industry level characteristics is the existence of a 
sectoral collective bargaining agreement. It is found that works council presence is positively 
correlated with general training but not with the provision of firm-specific technical training. 
The coefficient estimate for the collective agreement dummy is insignificant throughout and 
the same is true for the interaction term between works council presence and a collective 
agreement. Next, logit estimates of the determinants of incremental innovations show 
positive and well determined coefficients all three training measures and insignificant 
coefficients for collective bargaining. The logits for radical innovation reveal a strong positive 
correlation between firm-specific training and radical innovation but a weak positive 
correlation for general training, although neither survives accounting for reverse causality 
(with successful innovators being more likely to invest in training activities). 
Four German-language works council studies also merit consideration because of their 
recognition of the importance of type and/or strength (and weakness) of the agency. Dilger 
(2002) uses data from the Technology and Work Organization in Mechanical Engineering 
(NIFA) Panel, 1991-1998, that not only contains information on whether or not the firm has a 
works councils but also allows for differentiation between types of works council, including 
their degree of involvement as assessed by management while charting their foundation and 
dissolution. Although Dilger’s results point to a positive but insignificant impact of the entity 
on product innovation, the works council effect assumes significance in circumstances where 
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managers consider the agency to embody greater responsibilities than legally prescribed 
under law.  A similar result is reported by Scholl, Breitling, Janetzke, and Shajek (2013) in their 
study of how and to what effect works councils and employees participate in process 
innovations, broadly interpreted. They authors offer 44 case studies (19 drawing on 
(re)organization, 19 dealing with changes in personnel policy such as improvements in work-
life balance, and 6 involving software innovations). The authors’ path analyses support their 
central hypothesis that the more intense works council and employee involvement, the more 
successful and encompassing are process innovations of this genre.  
In their analysis of approximately 1,700 responses to the Works Council Survey 
2008/2009 of the WSI (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut, or Economic and 
Social Research Institute),11 consisting of a random sample of private-sector companies with a 
works council and at least 20 employees,  and  separate evaluation of 26 case studies, 
Kriegesmann and Kley (2012) offer a potentially important qualification. Although the study 
suggests that works councils display a positive attitude toward innovation and are motivated 
to develop their own ideas on involvement in the innovation processes, the most important 
obstacles inhibiting innovation-oriented co-determination are also laid at the door of the 
agency. Here, the authors single out the contextual and specific knowledge deficits of 
councils.  
Finally, Jirjahn (2012) returns us to the works council-collective bargaining nexus. 
Using information from the second wave of the Hannover Firm Panel, he examines the effect 
of works councils and collective bargaining on (successful) innovative activity, as indexed by 
the share of turnover accounted for by newly-developed products.  He reports that neither 
works councils nor sectoral bargaining taken in isolation significantly influence innovative 
activity. However, allowing for the interaction between the two institutions proves decisive. 
Collective bargaining now has a significantly negative impact on innovation success, and 
although the works council own-effect remains insignificant once interacted with collective 
bargaining its effect is strongly positive. The principal rationalization is that where works 
councils are less concerned with distributional conflict their cooperative function can come to 
the fore and foster greater innovative success.  
The modern German literature thus suggests that the institutions of industrial 
relations might have different effects on different types of innovation and that this may in 
part reflect the degree of involvement and authority of the workplace institution. The results 
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are mixed with respect to the interaction between works councils and collective bargaining 
proper, which outcome may in part reflect unobserved differences in works council type. 
Although our dataset does not allow us to operationalize a typology of works councils we can 
differentiate between innovation types. More importantly, we can examine in some detail the 
interaction between industrial relations institutions as well as the largely neglected issue of 
causation.12 In paying close attention to the causation issue, we will follow a research strategy 
more in keeping with Addison, Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner’s (2007) investigation of 
investment in physical capital. These authors used several complementary estimation 
strategies that exploit the formation or dissolution of a works council – comparing plants that 
set up (dissolved) councils with those that never (always) had a works council.  No evidence 
was found to suggest that the formation (abandonment) of a council had an unfavorable 
(favorable) effect on investment. Nor for that matter were changes in works council found to 
have positive effects on the investment bottom line. However, the authors only examined 
changes in works council status between 1998 and 2000 (linked to changes in investment 
between 2000 and 2003), and were at pains to caution that changes in these worker 
representation bodies were rare events. For example just 29 (33) plants set up (dissolved) 
works councils compared with the 1,668 (765) plants in which they were never (always) 
present). Vulgo: identification on the basis of changes in work council status is hazardous, 
even if an improvement on the standard cross section dichotomous variable approach.  We 
are on firmer ground not only in considering a longer interval but also in focusing on changes 
in collective bargaining when investigating the bargaining-works council nexus.  
 
The Dataset 
Our dataset is extracted from the most comprehensive establishment-level survey 
conducted in Germany, namely the IAB Establishment Panel (IAB-Betriebspanel). Designed to 
encompass a wide range of employment policy-related topics, including labor force 
composition and turnover (hiring and separations), wages, working hours, training, and public 
funding, as well as investment, innovation, and other business policies and developments, the 
Establishment Panel is an annual representative sample that currently covers some 16,000 
establishments in all sectors of the economy. Most importantly for our purposes, the survey 
comprises a longitudinal component that is critical in our approach to identification, as 
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described in the next two sections of the paper. (Further details on the IAB establishment 
survey are to be found in Ellguth, Kohaut, and Möller, 2014, and Fischer et al., 2009.) 
Our observation window covers the 2008-2013 surveys. In practice, however, we are 
looking at variables dated from 2007 until 2012. This is because for some key arguments the 
relevant information collected in year t pertains to year t-1. We do not range further back in 
time by reason of there being a break in the innovation measure. Specifically, prior to 2008, 
the questionnaire inquired of the innovation outcome in the last two years, rather than in the 
last year as in the 2008 though 2013 rounds. 
The innovation variable is coded as a 1/0 dummy variable that indicates the presence 
(or absence) of the selected type of innovation. The different innovation categories are 
defined according to the Oslo Manual guidelines (see OECD, 2005). Briefly, establishments 
can engage in either process or product innovation (or no such innovation). Product 
innovation is divided into three distinct categories: imitative, incremental, and radical, defined 
respectively as the introduction of a product or service that was already available from other 
firms in the market, an improvement to or further development of a product or service 
already supplied by the establishment, and the introduction of an entirely new product or 
service for which a new market has been created. For their part, process innovations are new 
procedures developed by establishments designed to improve the production process or the 
supply of services.  
Turning to the information on the presence or otherwise of collective bargaining, the 
survey allows us to distinguish between firm-level agreements, industry-wide or sectoral 
agreements, and individual agreements between workers and firm (i.e. no collective 
bargaining at all). We make no attempt to use the information on orientation (i.e. whether an 
uncovered establishment supposedly shadows the wage settlements agreed at industry level 
(but see Addison et al., 2012). Nor for that matter do we look at situations in which collective 
agreements have either recognized or implemented so-called opt-out clauses (or opening 
clauses) and/or company-level pacts for competitiveness. In each case, the main reason is 
that the relevant information is not observed on a yearly basis. Specifically, from the 
perspective of our observation window, information on pacts was collected in 2008 and 2009 
but not in 2010 or in 2011, while the question on opt-out clauses was asked only in 2011. 
(The implications of opening clauses and pacts for competitiveness are discussed in Heinbach, 
2007; Brändle and Heinbach, 2013; and Bellmann, Gerner, and Hübler, 2013.) Regarding the 
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second pillar of the German dual industrial relations system – the works council – the variable 
is coded as a 1/0 dummy.  
Finally, we assembled a wide set of control variables from the survey. Apart from 
industry controls (14 industry dummies), these included variables capturing the 
establishment’s workforce structure (its skill, gender, part-time/full-time composition and 
type of working arrangement), together with its size, age, state of technology, ownership, 
single-establishment status, share of exports in sales, expected sales development, 
competitive pressure, profit situation, presence of an R&D department, whether the 
establishment resulted from a spin-off, and whether there were any organizational 
developments that resulted in the integration of other establishments.  In addition, since the 
survey contains information on the volume of total investments as well as the percentage of 
total investments allocated to the expansion of the establishment, we included the latter in 
our set of regressors. In the context of the pooled model implementation (see Table 5 below), 
we will also use a specific survey question contained in the 2009, 2011 and 2013 waves in 
which establishments were asked if they had innovation plans that were not actually 
implemented. 
Our sample is restricted to plants with at least five employees operating within the 
private sector of the economy. Establishments from the agricultural and extractive sectors 
were excluded as were plants in the public utilities. Finally, the 2009 changes in industrial 
classification were accommodated. In particular, since sectors in the 2007 and 2008 waves 
are grouped using the NACE Revision 1.1, while in 2009 and 2010 the classification is based on 
NACE Revision 2, we decided to use the latter for all establishments coded under both 
systems. However for establishments in waves 2007 and/or 2008 but not 2009 or 2010, we 
used the ad hoc procedure of ‘the most likely transition,’ on the basis of observed transitions 
(i.e. changes in sector classification from one system to another) for all those establishments 
that are coded under both systems. 
 
Preliminary Analysis  
Our actual 6-year observation window, 2007–2012, allows us to examine innovation 
both in cross section and longitudinally. This is a necessary starting point as we need to 
ensure that single- and multi-observed (i.e. panel) units are not too “distinct” from the 
perspective of their innovation profile. 
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At the outset, note that our variable of interest – here the particular innovation 
outcome – flags whether or not an establishment actually introduced some process or 
product innovation. We are therefore not considering innovation inputs, such as R&D 
intensity, and so a majority of establishments are not expected to answer in the affirmative 
when they are asked about innovation in the previous business year. Thus, as shown in Table 
1, for those establishments that are observed in each year of the sample period, the 
proportion always responding that they have introduced, say, an incremental innovation is 
22.2 percent (=[735/3,305]*100). For those establishments observed one, two, three, four, 
and five times over the same interval the proportion of similar such always-innovators is 
rather volatile at 50.2, 36.7, 30.3, 25.9, and 26.8 percent, respectively. In contrast, the group 
of establishments that have never introduced an incremental innovation accounts for 24.1 
percent (=797/3,305) of all cases in which an establishment is continually observed over the 
six-year span, while the corresponding proportion within the group of establishments 
observed one, two, three, four, and five times is equal to 49.8, 38.9, 33.9, 27.0, and 
20.6 percent, respectively. It seems that although there is a fair share of establishments for 
whom incremental innovation is highly persistent, a sizable sub-set of German establishments 
is seemingly “disconnected” from this type of innovation. 
[Table 1 near here] 
In the case of imitative innovation, the corresponding shares of always- (never-) 
innovators are 4.8, 31.4, 17.7, 10.6, 7.5, and 7.2 percent (39.1, 68.6, 56.3, 51.2, 46.5, and 49.8 
percent) for those establishments that were observed always, one, two, three, four, and five 
times, respectively. In turn, the share of always- (never-) radical innovators is as expected 
substantially lower (higher) than those observed for imitative innovation, at 1.2, 13.3, 5.0, 2.4, 
1.6, and 2.1 percent (68.7, 86.7, 80.6, 76.9, 73.9, and 66.5 percent), respectively. The 
corresponding figures for process innovation are slightly larger (smaller) at 5.1, 27.7, 14.8, 
10.3, 7.0, and 7.2 percent (48.7, 72.3, 63.1, 59.1, 52.7, 44.8, and 48.7 percent). Finally, the 
proportion of always-innovators of any type, that is, the proportion of establishments that 
have introduced either a product (incremental, imitative or radical) or process innovation 
continually over the 6-year span is 29.1 (=960/3,300) percent of the total number of units 
observed consecutively over the selected period, while for those that were observed once, 
twice, three, four, and five times the corresponding shares are 60.8, 47.3, 37.8, 32.4, and 33.8 
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percent. The shares of never-innovators of any type are roughly three-fifths of those in the 
corresponding group of always innovators.  
Incremental innovation thus appears to be the most common type of innovation 
among establishments in the sample, while radical innovation is not only the least common 
but also the least persistent or continuous type of innovation. On the other hand, the 
incidence of product innovation is higher and more ongoing than process innovation, whereas 
a comparison of singly-observed and panel units reveals that the share of always-innovators is 
decreasing among those units that are observed up to six consecutive years. This latter result 
implies that pure cross-section units tend to reveal a higher incidence of innovation than 
panel units, a pattern that is common to all types of innovation.  
Table 2 presents the conditional and unconditional probability of innovation in the 
pooled data. The first row of the table gives the unconditional probability of an establishment 
having introduced an innovation by type of innovation. The remaining rows give that 
probability conditional on works council and collective bargaining status. Without 
conditioning on any other observables, it seems that works councils and collective bargaining 
are associated with a higher incidence of innovation of all types, although not exactly in the 
same degree. For example, the incidence of incremental innovation among establishments 
with (without) works councils is 64.3 (41.1) percent, while in establishments with a sectoral 
agreement (no collective agreement) incremental innovation occurs in 48.5 (46.9) percent of 
the cases. The data also suggest that firm agreements are slightly more favorable to 
innovation than sectoral agreements. 
[Table 2 near here] 
Disaggregating by sector – namely, manufacturing and services in panels (b) and (c) of 
the table – yields a similar result. That is, innovation is more often found in establishments 
with works councils than otherwise, while collective bargaining coverage seems more 
favorable to innovation and especially so in manufacturing. 
Finally, although innovation is far more common in large than small establishments, 
much the same institutional patterns are evident in the data. In particular, establishments 
with works councils and sectoral agreements are generally more favorable to innovation 
across all establishment size categories groups. (The details are not provided here, but full 
information is available from the authors upon request.) 
[Table 3 near here] 
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Table 3 presents tetrachoric correlation coefficients (that is, the correlation between 
any two pairs of binary variables) for our institutional and innovation measures. These 
statistics were obtained using a biprobit model with no covariates included in the regression. 
Observe that works councils are strongly and positively associated with innovation, while the 
correlation between innovation and sectoral agreements is now weaker, both in absolute 
terms and statistical significance. Firm-level agreements in particular appear more favorable 
to innovation than sectoral agreements, especially in the case of incremental. 
These preliminary results do not control for observable, establishment-level 
characteristics other than the presence of collective bargaining and worker representation 
institutions. We next consider whether this indicative evidence survives explicit modeling of 
the innovation decision. In particular, we want to know the extent to which the conjectures 
set in the introductory sections of this paper hold.  
 
Regression Results Using Pooled Data 
We start by modeling innovation in an exclusively pooled data framework in which our 
(dichotomous) innovation variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, is a function of two sets of observables, say 𝑍𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑍′𝑖𝑡, where the former vector indicates the selected institutional union and worker 
representation categories (namely the four combinations of sectoral agreement and works 
council status as described below) and the latter establishment-level observables, and where 
subscripts i and t denote establishment and year. The 𝑍′ vector of characteristics includes 
workforce composition, and the export orientation, ownership, size, location, competitive 
pressure, and profit situation, inter al. (See the data section for the full description of this set.)  
In practice, our first regression model is a simple pooled probit (omitting the time 
subscript): 
Pr( 𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) = Φ(𝑋𝑖𝛽),                             (1) 
where 𝑋 now denotes the full set of time-varying and time-invariant establishment-level 
observables (i.e. 𝑍 and 𝑍′), 𝛽 is the set of parameters to be estimated, and Φ denotes the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
In the interests of simplicity, we select establishments that are either covered or not 
covered by a sectoral agreement and works councils, giving a total of four possible 
combinations: no sectoral agreement-no works council (the reference category), no sectoral 
agreement-works council, sectoral agreement-no works council, and sectoral agreement-
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works council. This means that a negative sign on any of the selected interaction terms 
implies that the respective institutional setting is unfavorably associated with innovation, in 
comparison with the reference group. Note that in this setting we exclude all establishments 
that are covered by a firm-level agreement. The goal is to increase comparability with the 
difference-in-difference exercise below in which we examine only the sectoral agreement 
case. This procedure also allows us to keep our robustness exercises more manageable. An 
alternative would be to use a single category – covered or not covered by a collective 
agreement of any type – but ultimately we considered that any amalgamation of the two 
groups would be less transparent. We also refrain from analyzing the separate group of firm-
level agreements by reason of its modest sample size. (Firm-level agreements represent 7.5 
percent of the whole sample.) 
[Table 4 near here]  
 Table 4 presents the results of fitting a linear probability model rather than the pooled 
probit. This is because we subsequenty wish to allow for the inclusion of selectivity terms in 
the model – that is, for selection into collective agreements and works council status  – and 
the use of a linear probability model at this stage ensures maximum comparability across our 
results.13 
As indicated in the first three rows of  the table, the institutional coefficient estimates 
are not statistically significant in one-half of the cases. At first blush, therefore, the role of the 
selected institutional variables seems underwhelming, particularly in the cases of imitative 
and radical innovation. It is nevertheless of note that for the sectoral agreements-no works 
council and sectoral agreements-works council combinations four out of six coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels. Since they are negative in the 
former combination and positive in the latter, the seeming inference is that sectoral 
agreements without (with) works councils are unlikely (likely) to be associated with a higher 
probability of innovation.14 
 Regarding the role of the other covariates, the presence of an R&D department, 
training, state-of-the-art equipment, a skilled workforce, export orientation, higher expected 
sales, and establishment size (not separately reported in the table) are strongly favorable to 
(or at least positively associated with) all types of innovation. Competitive pressure is also 
positive and highly statistically significant. On the other hand, the profit situation, the 
existence of spin-offs, and integration of other establishments seem to be of little relevance.  
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At the suggestion of a referee, we also ran the model adding a productivity variable to 
the set of regessors, where productivity is measured by real gross value added per full-time 
employee. The variable was statistically significant for one of the six innovation measures, and 
despite a 22 percent reduction in the number of useable observations, eight out of the nine 
statististically significant coefficients reported in the first three rows of Table 4 maintained 
their statistical significance. Changes in the remaining coefficients were trivial. In turn, re-
running the model for the same reduced sample, now with the exclusion of the productivity 
variable, produced virtually no change in the results.15 
We note in passing that disaggregating by sector shows that in manufacturing most 
institutional coefficients are again negative and predominantly insignificant, although in the 
case of services the effect of the sectoral agreement-no works council combination on 
innovation while generally negative is less pronounced than in the manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore, sectoral agreements in conjunction with works councils seem to be slightly 
more favorable to innovation in services than in the case of the manufacturing sector. (Full 
results by sector are available upon request.)  
Two major issues arise in the context of model (1). One is the possible 
interdependence of sectoral agreements and works council presence, the other is the 
assumed exogeneity of the two variables in the innovation equation. In recognition of these 
issues, we next offer two alternative approaches to estimation, first by deploying a recursive 
multivariate probit with three equations, and second by introducing selectivity terms – or 
inverse Mills’ ratios – in the outcome equation.  
More formally, in the first case we have the following recursive, simultaneous-
equations model (again omitting the time subscript): 
𝑌𝑖1
∗ = 𝑋𝑖1 𝛽1 + 𝑒𝑖1   
𝑌𝑖2
∗ = 𝑋𝑖2 𝛽2 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑖1+𝑒𝑖2           (2) 
𝑌𝑖3
∗ = 𝑋𝑖3 𝛽3 + +𝛿1𝑌𝑖1 + 𝛿2𝑌𝑖2 + 𝑒𝑖3, 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗
∗  is the corresponding latent variable and 𝑌𝑖𝑗 (the observed variable) is defined as 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 1 if  𝑌𝑖𝑗
∗ > 0, and 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 0 if 𝑌𝑖𝑗
∗ ≤ 0; j=1, 2, 3 denoting the sectoral agreement, works 
council, and innovation binary variables, respectively. In the actual implementation we will 
also include the case in which the innovation equation includes a sectoral agreements-works 
council combination.16 
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 Our second, single-equation approach sets the innovation outcome, 𝑌3, as a function 
of a given set of 𝑋 exogenous variables, plus the sectoral agreement and works council terms 
and the corresponding inverse Mills’ ratio terms, 𝜆𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑏and 𝜆𝑖
𝑤𝑜𝑐𝑜, respectively, obtained from a 
bivariate probit with two choice equations. In this case, we will estimate the following pooled 
linear probability model:17 
𝑌𝑖3 = 𝑋𝑖3
′ 𝛽3
′ + 𝑑1𝑌𝑖1 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑖2 + 𝑎1𝜆𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑏  + 𝑎2𝜆𝑖
𝑤𝑜𝑐𝑜 + ℰ𝑖3.     (3) 
In the context of the recursive model shown in (2), if we find that the three equations 
are statistically independent – or that 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑒𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑖𝑘) = 𝜌𝑗𝑘 = 0 for all 𝑗, 𝑘 = 1,2,3, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 – 
then the innovation equation can indeed be estimated as a separate equation. In other 
words, the results from Table 4 would be sufficiently informative. For the alternative single-
equation approach in model (3), involving two selection terms, the same implication would 
follow were 𝜆𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑏and 𝜆𝑖
𝑤𝑜𝑐𝑜 to prove statistically insignificant and the coefficients in the 
innovation equation largely insensitive to their introduction. 
But it is instructive to preface this technical analysis by first looking at some 
descriptive evidence. In particular, one has to question whether or not some establishment-
level characteristics omitted from Table 4 (i.e. not included in the corresponding set of control 
variables) are correlated in some obvious fashion with a particular sectoral agreement (or 
works council) configuration.  To this end, we use question 26 of the 2009 survey (reiterated 
as question 24 and question 25 in the 2011 and 2013 surveys).18 Specifically, survey 
respondents were first asked whether their establishments had any innovation plans that 
were not actually carried out, and if so which of eight possible reasons applied. Table 5 
combines establishment collective agreement and works council status on the one hand with 
reported reason for not implementing the innovation plans on the other. Each cell of the 
table gives the corresponding incidence across the two institutions, namely with and without 
a sectoral agreement/works council. Our conjecture is that had the organization problems 
and economic risk (two unobserved characteristics in Table 4), for example, been inherently 
innate to a particular collective agreement-worker representation configuration, we would 
expect to observe a much more differentiated incidence of these two characteristics across 
the two institutional types. (The underlying hypothesis here is that these two characteristics 
are correlated with the innovation outcome.) Indeed, as shown in the second and fourth 
columns of Table 5, the mean comparison test rejects the null in only one case. That is: the 
null hypothesis that the incidence of ‘high economic risk’ and ‘organizational problems’ in 
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establishments with and without sectoral agreements is the same is never rejected, while 
across establishments with and without works council is rejected only in 2008. For the 
remaining six reasons, the null is rejected in six cases (out of 36). 
[Table 5 near here] 
 The evidence on the interdependence between sectoral agreements and works 
councils can also be examined using the descriptive transition data reported in Tables 6 and 7. 
Two issues are examined: first, how frequent are changes in status; and, second, to what 
extent are the transitions in, say, sectoral agreements followed by transitions in works 
councils?19 
Note that although rare, the introduction and abandonment of sectoral agreements in 
Table 6 is much more frequent than is the case for works councils. Indeed, the frequency is 
threefold that for works councils. In other words, sectoral agreement switchers amount to 
approximately 6 percent of the total (this is the average taken over all six columns in the 
table), while works council switchers are only 2 percent. The remaining 94 and 98 percent, 
respectively, are made up of sectoral agreement (works council) never members and always 
members (54.5 and 35.5 percent, and 67.4 and 30.3 percent, respectively.) 
[Tables 6 and 7 near here] 
Moreover, as shown in Table 7, the few observed changes in works council status can 
scarcely be linked with changes in the relevant sectoral agreements. The most likely event – 
and by a large margin – is where a scb joiner maintains its works council status (as either 
covered or not covered). In fact, only 4 percent of this category actually change works council 
status in the same year (see the first row, first column of panel (a) of Table 7), 3 percent in the 
following year, 4 percent two years later, and 2 percent after three and five years. At the price 
of some oversimplification, over a period of six years, out of 100 scb joiners roughly 10 either 
introduce or abandon a works council. For its part, the evidence on works council transitions 
in connection with scb leavers, given in panel (b) of the table, follows virtually the same 
pattern.  
In sum, the raw descriptive data in Tables 6 and 7 do not seem to indicate any obvious 
interdependence between the two institutions, while the evidence taken from Table 5 
indicates that unobserved establishment traits are unlikely to have substantive impact at least 
on failure-to-innovate decisions.  
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 With these preliminaries behind us we next returm to our formal tests of 
interdependence, beginning with that between sectoral agreement status and works council 
transitions, using the recursive multivariate probit described in model (2) above. This 
implementation is conducted for a pure pooled dataset. The goal is to determine whether or 
not the correlation across unobservables in the three equations of the system is statistically 
different from zero. If the (likelihood ratio) test does not reject the null of no correlation, 
sectoral agreements and works councils can be taken as exogenous in the innovation 
equation.20 
The results of this exercise are given in Table 8. The second column of the table 
confirms that works councils are more likely when sectoral agreements are present, while in 
the third column suggests that although works council presence per se seems to be favorable 
to innovation no such suggestion follows in the case of sectoral agreements that, taken in 
isolation, do not appear to favor innovation. Only the combination of the two institutions 
points to greater innovative activity, as shown in the fourth column of the table. Note that for 
reasons of economy the material in this column presents just the coefficients of the third 
equation of the recursive system in which an interaction term between the two institutions is 
added to the right-hand-side of the innovation equation. The coefficient estimates from the 
sectoral agreement and works council choice equations look very similar to those presented 
in the second and third columns of the table. 
[Table 8 near here] 
The most striking result, however, is the finding that no single 𝜌𝑗𝑘  is statistically 
different from zero; nor is the null of 𝜌21 = 𝜌31 = 𝜌32 = 0 rejected. It cannot therefore 
automatically be claimed that the role played by the two institutions in innovation reported in 
Table 4 is simply the result of the presence of some unobserved establishment traits. 
Moreover, the findings from Table 8 at a pinch suggest that the presumption of exogeneity in 
Table 4 is ultimately harmless. 
Finally, we examine the alternative approach to examining the possible 
interdependence between sectoral agreements and works council presence in the innovation 
equation based on model (3). In constructing two selectivity terms in the innovation equation, 
one for each institutional variable, we estimated the determinants of works councils and 
sectoral agreement choices using a bivariate probit framework, although as a practical matter 
the results are virtually the same if the estimation is run in separate equations. 
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[Table 9 near here] 
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 9. (Recall that the comparator is 
Table 4 above.) As shown in the table, the selectivity term for the presence of a sectoral 
agreement is statistically significantly different from zero in three out of six cases (see the 
sixth row in the table), while the corresponding term for a works council is statistically 
significant – albeit marginally so – in just one instance (out of six cases, in the fifth row). But 
the key finding is that the impact on the sign and statistical significance of the three 
interaction terms is very mild, with virtually all the coefficients and statistical significance 
unchanged. The same holds for the remaining right-hand-side variables. 
We note that the underlying biprobit specification (not reported in Table 9) contains 
further training and the share of part-time workers in the works council equation, while the 
sectoral agreement equation contains the share of high-skilled workers. The coefficients of 
these variables are highly statistically significant except in the case of the share of part-time 
workers. Otherwise the set of regressors is common. We did experiment with alternative sets 
of regressors and found no real sensitivity in the results. Interestingly, competitive pressure 
and the profit situation seem more relevant to sectoral agreements than to works council 
presence, while the state-of-the-art technology, for example, seems to be more keen to 
works council presence. The null of no interdependence between the two choice equations in 
the biprobit is rejected comfortably (at the 0.01 level or better). Finally, the positive sign of 
the selectivity term for the presence of sectoral agreements indicates that establishments 
that select themselves into that status have also a higher chance to innovate. For the 
recursive model implemented in Table 8 there was no statistical evidence favoring this 
presumption. 
 
Results Based on a Difference-in-Differences Strategy 
In this section, we exploit the panel structure of the data in a more direct way, that is, 
in a constructed difference-in-differences (DiD) framework. We focus on sectoral agreements 
and, by assuming that unobserved firm-specific traits are time-invariant, we compare proper 
comparison groups – namely sectoral agreement leavers vs. sectoral agreement always 
members on the one hand, and sectoral agreement joiners versus sectoral agreement never 
members on the other – to obtain an alternative measure of the impact of sectoral 
agreements on innovation. This exercise is conducted using several robustness tests designed 
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to evaluate the randomness of the sectoral agreement (and works councils) switching status 
behavior. We will supplement the analysis by providing a falsification or placebo test.  
The construction of the DiD exercise can be described as follows. Firstly, we retain 
those establishments that are observed consecutively over the 2007-2012 observation 
window. Next, we define a pre-treatment and a treatment period, say, 𝑡0 and 𝑡1. Lastly, we 
select the comparison groups (e.g. sectoral agreement leavers vs. sectoral agreement always 
members). Our procedure then amounts to selecting 2007–2008 as the pre-treatment period 
(our 𝑡0 period), and 2009–2012 as the treatment period (our 𝑡1 period). This is the medium- 
to long-run case. Since this scenario has the obvious disadvantage of requiring that the 
included establishments be observed over six consecutive years – thus reducing the size of 
the estimation sample in an obvious manner – our main focus is rather on the ‘pooled’ case. 
In this alternative scenario, we require establishments to be observed only over four 
consecutive years and define 𝑡0 and 𝑡1 as consecutive 2-year intervals to obtain the pooling of 
three moving windows: 𝑡0=2007-2008; 𝑡1=2009-2010 (the first window), 𝑡0=2008-2009; 
𝑡1=2010-2011 (the second); and 𝑡0=2009-2010; 𝑡1=2011-2012 (the third). This procedure 
allows a substantial increase sample size.21 
Take the ‘treatment’ group of sectoral agreements joiners and the ‘control’ group of 
sectoral agreement never members. Having defined 𝑡0 and 𝑡1, we focus on the group of 
establishments that in 𝑡0 are not covered by a sectoral agreement and compare the 
innovation incidence among those establishments that have joined a collective agreement in 
𝑡1 with the innovation incidence of those that have stayed uncovered. In other words, by 
running the innovation variable on sectoral agreement status (both dated in 𝑡1) plus some 
control variables to take account of potential confounding factors (dated at 𝑡0) – either using 
a probit or a linear probability model – we have by construction a difference-in-differences 
estimate of the effect of joining a sectoral agreement on innovative activity; and mutatis 
mutandis for the effect of leaving a sectoral agreement, in which case one needs to select the 
subsample of establishments covered by a sectoral agreement in 𝑡0 and again regress 
innovation on sectoral agreement status, both dated in 𝑡1.  
In the interests of transparency and the obligation to avoid imposing an artificial 
symmetry on the effects of collective bargaining on innovation, we propose to further refine 
the selected subsamples. In particular, we separate establishments with a revealed history of 
no innovation (in 𝑡0) from those that exhibit some propensity to innovate (in 𝑡0). Thus, and 
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assuming 𝑡0=2007-08 and 𝑡1=2009-10, we take an establishment that has no innovation in 
2007 and 2008 to be a non-innovator, and consider as an innovator a plant that introduced an 
innovation in either 2007 or 2008 (or in both years). Since establishments are classified as 
either innovators or non-innovators (but not both), this means that we will be dealing with 
four different scenarios outlined in Table 10.  
[Tables 10 near here] 
Tables 11 and 12 present the DiD estimates of the effect of joining/leaving a sectoral 
agreement on innovation. As mentioned earlier, the reduction in sample size forces us 
exclusively on sectoral agreements and upon a single outcome, given by the ‘any type of 
innovation’ composite. We will also report results arising exclusively from a linear probability 
model. Within this framework we also want to test whether sectoral bargaining switching can 
be taken as exogenous. To this end, we employ a similar approach to that followed in model 
(3) above. This means that in each scenario reported in Tables 11 and 12 we will have two 
columns, without and with controls for the endogeneity of sectoral agreeement transitions.  
The estimation sample in Table 11 includes works councils switchers, which means that in this 
case the corresponding selectivity terms control for the exogeneity of switching in the worker 
representation vehicle. In Table 12 the selectivity term accounts only for works council 
presence as all works councils switchers are dropped from the sample. 
[Tables 11 near here] 
The critical finding from Table 11 is that out of eight scenarios in panels (a) and (b) the 
sectoral agreement coefficient is statistically significant only for leavers in panel (a)/fourth 
column and for joiners in in panel (b)/first column. As shown by the negative coefficient in the 
first column of panel (b), joining a sectoral agreement without a works council being present 
decreases the probability of innovation in 𝑡1 for an establishment that had introduced some 
type of innovation in 𝑡0. So we again find that the combination of sectoral agreements 
without works councils seems not to favor innovative activity, a result consistent with our 
preliminary findings in Tables 3 and 4, for example. In turn, the positive coefficient in the 
fourth column of panel (a) shows that one cannot exclude circumstances in which leaving may 
also be favorable to innovation. But the predominant lack of statistical significance in 
‘treatment’ effects in Table 11 serves more to indicate that collective bargaining does not 
apparently impair innovation to any material degree in Germany. Finally, there is also little 
tangible evidence of endogeneity of sectoral agreements and works councils playing a 
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determining role in our results:  in only two cases (out of sixteen possibilities) does the 
selectivity correction term achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. Observe also 
that the scb coefficient barely changes after introduction of the selectivity terms. 
In Table 12 we implement a slightly different procedure in which we reduce the 
number of scenarios to a total of four cases by dropping all works council switchers while 
adding a works council dummy to the model specification. The model includes again two 
selectivity correction terms for the possible endogeneity of sectoral agreements transitions 
and works council presence, respectively. As in the previous table, in 𝑡1 we regress innovation 
on collective bargaining status to obtain the effect of, say, joining a collective agreement on 
innovation, controlling for beginning-period (i.e. 𝑡0) works council status and other 
establishment-level characteristics. As indicated in the first row of the table, in no case is 
there evidence of a statistically significant causal relationship between sectoral agreements 
and innovation. The positive coefficient in the leaving vs. staying covered case is the 
exception, confirming the result reported in panel (a) of Table 11. Again, the scb coefficient is 
virtually unchanged across the columns with and without selectivity terms. 
[Table 12 near here] 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the evidence based on difference-in-differences is less clear-
cut than in Table 4. It will be recalled that establishments are now required to be observed 
over a period of four consecutive years which is a rather demanding data requirement. Our 
DiD approach also implied a further diminution in estimation sample as we sought to increase 
the number of meaningful comparisons across treatment and control groups. The limitations 
of this empirical approach notwithstanding, it does not appear to be the case that 
establishments materially influence innovation with the decision to leave (join) sectoral 
agreements as compared with those establishments that decide to stay put, remaining 
covered (uncovered). Nor is it plausible to suppose that leaving a sectoral agreement when no 
works council is present is more favorable to innovation than the situation where one is 
present. And none of these results seems to be critically sensitive to endogeneity issues. 
For completeness, we present a summary evaluation of the medium-term effects of 
joining/leaving a sectoral agreement on innovation. For the sake of argument, we ignore in 
this presentation any discussion of endogeneity issues. Instead, we focus exclusively on the 
estimates extracted from a simple exercise in which we extend the post-treatment period 𝑡1 
to 2009-2012, where the pre-treatment period 𝑡0 comprises the 2007-08 interval.  The results 
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are given in Table 13.  All coefficient estimates are uniformly statistically insignificant, with the 
single exception shown in the last column of panel (b), where we report that leaving a 
sectoral agreement in the presence of a works council is unfavorable to innovation in the 
medium- to long-run. 
[Table 13 near here] 
Our last robustness test entails a falsification test. Essentially it asks what difference 
faking a change in sectoral agreement status would make to the innovation outcome. Given 
the structure and nature of our DiD exercise, finding a placebo is no easy task. Consider the 
case of scb joiners versus never scb members. For the group of placebo establishments, we 
have perforce to rely on all those establishments that are consecutively observed from 2007 
to 2012 and make an actual 2009-10 non-switcher a counterfeit 2009-10 switcher. In turn, 
and to simplify the implementation, the comparison group will be made up exclusively of 
those establishments that are (a) only observed in 2007-2010 and (b) scb never members 
throughout this interval. All we need for this exercise is a sufficiently large number of fake 
switchers. 
Now, had the results of the original DiD exercise using real switchers suggested that 
sectoral agreements were favorable to innovation, the placebos would not be expected to 
generate any visible effect on innovation. Since our findings have suggested an absence of 
effect rather than a clear negative or positive impact – implying that industrial relations 
institutions seem rather neutral or non-hostile – the interpretation of our falsification test is 
less straightforward. What seems clear though is that given that all the units in the placebo 
exercise are actually never scb members – to use the  joiners versus never members case for 
illustrative purposes – the results across the two groups of scb never members and placebo 
scb joiners – should not be statistically different. 
[Table 14 near here] 
The results of this final exercise are given in Table 14. No measurable effect is 
detected other than for the top left cell of panel (a), namely the joining scb vs. staying 
covered case.  Given that a placebo transition is not expected to generate any causal effect, 
the absence of statistical significance is anticipated. However, even if this exercise suggests 
that our selection of ‘control’ establishments of never members and always members 
throughout our DiD implementations is sensible, only a truly experimental/laboratory exercise 
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with random assignment of sectoral agreement status would fully validate a causal effect or 
otherwise obtained in a DiD exercise such as that conducted here.   
 
Conclusions 
This study seeks to provide an analysis of the effect of collective bargaining on innovation 
using both pooled data and difference-in-difference methods applied to a nationally 
representative set of German establishments. Since the theory is inconclusive regarding the 
impact of collective bargaining on innovation – albeit of late allowing more scope for country-
specific institutions to play a positive role in influencing outcomes – it is appropriate to 
reinvestigate an exemplar of cooperative industrial relations, Germany, in which the existence 
of a more thorough-going workplace consensus might be expected to ameliorate if not offset 
the standard hold-up problem confirmed to some large degree in North American studies. 
We assembled a unique dataset covering a period of six consecutive years, 2007-2012, 
in which complete and incomplete panel members are observed according to whether or not 
they introduced incremental, imitative, radical, or process innovation. Since both collective 
agreement and workplace codetermination status are also observed, our modeling strategy 
was ultimately designed to generate the effect of trade unions and works councils on 
innovation, free, as far as possible, from contamination stemming from selection issues 
associated with endogenous decisions regarding the choice of these two institutional entities. 
Our analysis began with a detailed examination of the key descriptive evidence on the 
incidence and persistence of the various types of innovation at establishment level, including 
their raw correlation with the selected institutional variables. Controlling for a wide set of 
covariates, our pooled data estimates suggested that the conjunction of the two institutions is 
relatively friendly to innovation. In other words, there is no sign of any dramatic, negative 
impact of collective bargaining agreements on innovation for Germany as has been reported 
for North America. Rather, all is rather quiet on this particular front, such that the long-
standing tradition of industry-wide agreements has not disrupted the observed pattern of 
innovative activity. We also reported that the impact of any German workplace consensus is 
larger for incremental than radical innovation – consistent with some past research – but no 
indication that the German institutions are less favorable to process than to product 
innovation. Training at the workplace and competitive pressure both seem to be associated 
with all types of innovation, but interestingly enough not the profit situation. 
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Our analysis of sectoral agreement and works council transitions and their relationship 
with innovation was conducted within a difference-in-differences framework. This procedure 
– which is not without difficulty as it requires establishments to be consecutively observed for 
a period of at least four years, a rather stringent requirement given the IAB dataset used here 
– has the virtue of allowing us to establish that there is no obvious statistical evidence 
favoring the hypothesis that the role of German institutions is fundamentally adversarial or 
even redistributive with respect to innovation. Rather, the suggestion is that joining sectoral 
agreements in the presence of a works council or leaving a sectoral agreement in their 
absence is not unlikely to be advantageous to innovation. However, the presence of some 
perverse signs and the impossibility of examining and testing some scenarios due to sample 
size serves as a reminder that the DiD exercise is not without its limitations. Using a 
falsification exercise, our final test procedure indicated that our earlier finding that 
institutions are not hostile to innovation, even from a medium- to long-run perspective, 
cannot be simply attributed to poor selection of the relevant control groups.  
The comprehensive analysis offered in this study has a fairly strong bottom line: there 
is no convincing evidence that German collective bargaining inhibits innovation. Indeed in 
conjunction with works councils, collective bargaining at sectoral level might even foster 
innovative activity. One caveat, however, concerns our innovation measure(s). Subjective in 
nature, the selected dichotomous variables can only crudely proxy complex innovation 
choices/decisions. In particular, they cannot capture expected differences in innovation 
intensity (and cost). There is therefore the need to supplement the present inquiry with a 
parallel analysis using other indicators of innovative activity (e.g. continuous input and output 
measures). Finally, only truly experimental exercises have the potential to validate the most 
sought after causal effects. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. We ignore for the moment the potential hold-up problem on the part of the employer.  
 
2. On the importance of the neglected firm discount factor, see Addison and Chilton (1998). 
 
3. The context is a Cournot duopoly model in which separate, firm-specific unions bargain ex 
post (i.e. there is no bargaining over R&D in the first stage) over wages and employment. 
Provided the union places sufficient weight on employment vis-à-vis wages, an increase in 
union bargaining power can be shown to promote employment and lead to higher market 
share. The firm is then supposed to raise its investment in R&D so as to protect this enhanced 
market share.  
 
4. Space constraints and the profoundly unsettled state of the empirical literature rule out 
separate consideration of human resource management innovation and “transformative” 
industrial relations practices. But readers are referred to Kizilos and Reshef (1997) for a 
discussion of how workplace unionization affects worker responses to human resource 
management practices, to Verma and Fang (2003) for an evaluation in the spirit of Slichter, 
Healy, and Livernash (1960) of whether the introduction of such practices makes a workplace 
more innovative and whether the ability to innovate is related to union status, and to Black 
and Lynch’s (2001) famous illustration of how a hypothetical union plant embracing total 
quality management, inter al., might outcompete nonunion establishments with the same set 
of practices. Suffice it to say that the literature has not established that high performance 
practices are distinctive with respect to unionism. Further, the relation between such 
innovative practices and firm performance remains opaque, not only because of ambiguities 
surrounding the costs of the practices in question but also because of profound causality 
issues that attend the largely unobserved timing (adoption and abandonment) of these 
industrial relations practices. 
 
5. Works councils are the expression of codetermination at workplace level. Codetermination 
is also practised at company or enterprise level, where for practical purposes it can be 
equated with worker directors. Space constraints pre-empt a theoretical discussion of worker 
board level representation. The rights and responsibilities of each codetermination body are 
given in Addison (2009).   
 
6.  The authors also investigate productivity growth (13 studies).   
 
7. One way of organizing the data from the various national studies is meta regression 
analysis. For one such attempt the reader is referred to Doucouliagos amd Laroche (2013) 
who investigate 27 studies from four countries (Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom,  and 
the United States) yielding 208 partial correlations of the union-innovation association. 
Differences in data, measurement of technology, and econometric specification emerge as 
key to differences in outcomes, but one secondary and controversial result is that union 
impact is negative across the board, contrary to the simple average partial correlations. 
However, potential offsets in the form of the more encopassing systems of labor 
regulation/employment protection are also reported. 
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8. But see Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) and Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2007) for the 
downside of employment protection legislation and wrongful discharge procedures in 
lowering employment and distorting production choices.   
 
9. The study also inquires into possible mechanisms. It is suggested that a reduction in R&D 
expenditures and reduced productivity of existing and newly-hired inventors, as well as the 
departure of innovative individuals, are the most likely culprits. There is also some suggestion 
that firms may redirect their innovation activities to states with less unionized workforces.   
 
10.  We do not consider codetermination at enterprise level, although the reader is referred 
to a key study by Kraft, Stank, and Deventer (2011) investigating the impact of the 1976 law 
extending worker representation on company supervisory boards to firms with at least 2,000 
employees. Innovation is measured by the number of patents granted. The authors report a 
positive effect of codetermination at company level on firms’ innovative behavior, yielding 
small marginal effects.    
 
11. For further information on the WSI survey, see Brehmer and Ziegler, 2009. 
 
12. The chief exception to this statement is the study by Canter, Gerstlberger, and Roy (2014) 
which also uses works councils as an instrument for a firm’s total (if not general) training  
activities  that correlate with innovation.  
 
13. Specifically, in comparing Tables 4 and 9. As a practical matter, the results in Table 4 are 
virtually the same as for a pooled probit. Results for the latter specification are available from 
the authors upon request. 
 
14. Replacing our dichotomous innovation variable in Table 4 with expansion investment – a 
very crude continuous measure of absorption innovation that is available in our dataset – and 
running either a pooled OLS or a panel regression yielded very weak results. Also, the 
coefficients in Table 4 were largely unchanged after adding the stock of capital to the set of 
regressors, using the procedure developed by Müller (2010). Both sets of results are available 
from the authors upon request.  
 
15. The set of right-hand-side variables was also extended to include a lagged dependent 
variable term and again very similar results to those reported in Table 4 were obtained in 
respect of the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the coefficients. (However, given 
the nature of the innovation variable, which is defined as an output measure, we would 
register our preference for the DiD strategy presented below as a means of addressing state 
dependence.) Full results of these three exercises are available upon request. 
 
16. 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , and 𝑋3  in model (2) need not to be different for identification. All that is 
required is sufficiently variability in the selected regressors, as is accomplished by our 
implementation. The standard reference for the recursive model (2) is Maddala (1983, p. 
123). This model also appears in Greene (2012, p. 786). 
 
17. This approach follows the rationale advanced in Hübler and Jirjahn (2003). 
 
18. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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19. Since woco transitions are very rare, we will not report any results related to sectoral 
agreement transitions subsequent to a change in works council status. 
 
20. AIternative implementations of the recursive model (such as random effects) are 
computationally more demanding and are not performed. For their part, alternative lagged 
relationships reduce sample size, while modeling the introduction/abandonment of sectoral 
agreements in connection with introduction/abandonment of works councils is not 
compelling given the evidence contained in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
21. Taking the 𝑡0=2007-2008 and 𝑡1=2009-2010 as an illustration, the observations are by 
construction collapsed to a single data point, given by the information on scb status and 
innovation, for example, in 𝑡1. It follows that we end up with a much smaller number of 
observations than in Table 4. This seems to be the main disadvantage of our construction. In 
any event, the raw number of scb leavers and scb joiners that met the requirements of our 
DiD exercise (pooled case) is still quite sizeable. Specifically, we have 142 (283) scb joiners and 
327 (884) scb leavers in the non-innovation (innovation) samples in a total of 5,612 (13,286) 
establishments (treated plus control groups). 
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TABLE 1 
INNOVATION IN GERMANY, ALL ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIVE EMPLOYEES IN THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR, 2007-2012 
  
Number of years an establishment is interviewed and answered “Yes” or 
“No” to the innovation question 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Number of years 
an 
establishment 
has introduced 
innovation in 
the previous 
year 
 
 
In
cr
em
en
ta
l 
0 2,202 1,015 505 324 246 797 5,089 
1 2,185 634 255 209 172 405 3,860 
2   958 279 178 151 380 1,946 
3     451 179 143 330 1,103 
4       311 163 298 772 
5         320 360 680 
6           735 735 
Total 4,387 2,607 1,490 1,201 1,195 3,305 14,185 
 
               
Im
it
at
io
n
 
0 3012 1466 764 558 478 1,291 7,569 
1 1377 679 346 258 225 631 3,516 
2   460 225 178 174 445 1,482 
3     158 115 139 310 722 
4       90 99 251 440 
5         86 211 297 
6           160 160 
Total 4,389 2,605 1,493 1,199 1,201 3,299 14,186 
 
               
R
ad
ic
al
 
0 3802 2,098 1,148 885 797 2,269 10,999 
1 582 375 211 179 190 484 2,021 
2   129 98 81 87 239 634 
3     36 34 62 129 261 
4       19 37 88 144 
5         25 54 79 
6           38 38 
Total 4,384 2,602 1,493 1,198 1,198 3,301 14,176 
 
               
P
ro
d
u
ct
 (
an
y 
ty
p
e)
 
0 1,854 810 401 250 192 590 4,097 
1 2,533 642 252 194 148 368 4,137 
2   1,150 307 189 140 377 2,163 
3     532 200 146 330 1,208 
4       364 190 349 903 
5         379 405 784 
6           883 883 
Total 4,387 2,602 1,492 1,197 1,195 3,302 14,175 
 
               
P
ro
ce
ss
 
0 3,172 1,640 877 628 534 1,603 8,454 
1 1,217 573 292 244 234 597 3,157 
2   385 163 142 144 304 1,138 
3     153 94 115 280 642 
4       84 79 193 356 
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5         86 147 233 
6           167 167 
Total 4,389 2,598 1,485 1,192 1,192 3,291 14,147 
A
n
y 
ty
p
e 
o
f 
in
n
o
va
ti
o
n
 
(p
ro
d
u
ct
 o
r 
p
ro
ce
ss
) 
0 1,718 754 377 229 169 530 3,777 
1 2,668 617 243 187 141 352 4,208 
2   1,230 305 187 138 358 2,218 
3     563 205 145 326 1,239 
4       387 200 354 941 
5         405 420 825 
6           960 960 
Total 4,386 2,601 1,488 1,195 1,198 3,300 14,168 
Notes: Innovation is a 1/0 dummy variable, defined as equal to 1 if an establishment reports having 
introduced the given type of innovation in the previous year, 0 otherwise. The first cell in the table, 
for example, indicates that out of 4,387 establishments observed only once over the sample period, 
2,202 claimed not to have introduced an incremental innovation. The corresponding row total 
indicates that 5,089 establishments (out of a total of 14,185 establishments) failed to introduce any 
incremental innovation at all. The reported results are based on the IAB establishment survey, 2008-
2013 waves. 
 
 
  
41 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
SAMPLE INNOVATION INCIDENCE IN GERMANY, ALL ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIVE 
EMPLOYEES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND IN MANUFACTURING AND SERVICES, 2007-2012 (IN 
PERCENT) 
 Type of innovation 
  incremental Imitation Radical Product Process Any type  
(a) Private sector 
    
 
 P(.) 49.1 28.7 11.8 55.7 24.7 58.1 
P(.|cb_status=scb) 48.5 28.3 11.3 54.8 25.0 57.0 
P(.|cb_status=fcb) 57.5 30.5 13.1 62.5 31.0 65.0 
P(.|cb_status=nocb) 46.9 27.0 11.0 53.5 21.6 55.9 
P(.|woco=0) 41.1 24.8 9.0 47.9 17.8 50.2 
P(.|woco=1) 64.3 34.2 16.3 69.6 36.4 72.0 
(b) Manufacturing       
P(.) 63.2 33.6 17.2 68.2 33.9 70.9 
P(.|cb_status=scb) 68.9 34.5 19.2 72.9 39.9 75.3 
P(.|cb_status=fcb) 70.2 36.2 17.2 73.7 38.3 76.6 
P(.|cb_status=nocb) 57.4 30.9 15.1 63.0 27.5 65.7 
P(.|woco=0) 52.6 29.5 13.6 58.6 23.6 61.4 
P(.|woco=1) 75.5 36.8 20.9 78.9 44.7 81.3 
(c) Services       
P(.) 48.5 24.0 9.0 52.6 23.4 55.1 
P(.|cb_status=scb) 46.6 24.4 7.1 50.4 22.6 53.0 
P(.|cb_status=fcb) 52.6 23.0 9.6 55.7 28.1 57.8 
P(.|cb_status=nocb) 48.3 22.3 9.3 52.2 21.9 54.6 
P(.|woco=0) 44.0 21.3 7.8 48.0 19.8 50.5 
P(.|woco=1) 60.1 29.1 10.3 63.4 31.2 65.7 
Notes: P(.) gives the sample probability (or the standardized proportion) of a given innovation type. It 
is obtained by dividing the number of cases in which an establishment reported having introduced a 
given type of innovation by the total number of cases observed. The conditional proportion 
P(.|woco=0), for example, gives the proportion of establishments that introduced a given innovation 
among the subset of establishments without a works council. P(.|cb_status=scb) is the corresponding 
probability within the subset of establishments covered by a sectoral agreement. Note also that the 
sectoral (firm-level) agreement dummy is equal to 0 if and only if there is no firm-level (sectoral) 
agreement. All variables are for the same year, which means that works council and collective 
bargaining status refer to the preceding year as do the innovation variables. Accordingly, waves 
2008-2013 of the survey are used, while the statistics displayed are for the observation window 
2007-2012. 
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TABLE 3 
TETRACHORIC CORRELATION BETWEEN INNOVATION AND SELECTED COMBINATIONS OF WORKS 
COUNCIL AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PRESENCE, ALL ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIVE 
EMPLOYEES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 2007-2012 
  
Type of innovation 
Incremental  Imitation  Radical  Product  Process  Any type  
Sectoral  
agreement 
0.025 *** 0.024 *** 0.009   0.020 ** 0.069 *** 0.018 ** 
N 34,432   34,437   34,435   34,427   34,407   34,421   
Firm-level   
agreement 
0.140 *** 0.056 *** 0.055 *** 0.122 *** 0.155 *** 0.125 *** 
N 22,595   22,595   22,588   22,591   22,576   22,588   
No collective 
agreement 
-0.048 *** -0.031 *** -0.018 * -0.040 *** -0.088 *** -0.039 *** 
N 37,248   37,249   37,248   37,243   37,222   37,239   
             
Works council 0.347 *** 0.166 *** 0.218 *** 0.331 *** 0.340 *** 0.338 *** 
N 37,348   37,350   37,349   37,343   37,322   37,339   
Notes: The reported coefficients provide the correlations between pairs of binary variables and are 
obtained using a biprobit model with no regressors. The works council and collective bargaining 
variables are dummies defined as equal to 1 if the institution is present, 0 otherwise. The sectoral 
(firm-level) agreement dummy is equal to 0 if and only if there is no firm-level (sectoral) agreement. 
All variables refer to the same year (see notes to Table 2). *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF INNOVATION IN GERMANY, ALL ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIVE EMPLOYEES IN THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR, 2007-2012 
  Incremental   Imitation   Radical   Product   Process   Any type   
No collective agreement-no works council (reference)             
No sectoral agreement-works council -0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.025 ** -0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.003     
  (0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015)     
Sectoral agreement-no works council -0.038 *** -0.013 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.038 *** -0.027 *** -0.04 *** 
  (0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.01)     
Sectoral agreement-works council 0.038 *** -0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
0.032 ** 0.025 ** 0.026 *   
  (0.014) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013)     
No/minor pressure (reference)             
Pressure: medium 0.040 *** 0.036 *** 0.010 * 0.045 *** 0.011 
 
0.051 *** 
  (0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.01)     
Pressure: substantial, which doesn't endanger the 
continued existence   
0.069 *** 0.068 *** 0.023 *** 0.073 *** 0.047 *** 0.08 *** 
(0.011) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011)     
Pressure: substantial, which endanger the continued 
existence  
0.046 *** 0.063 *** 0.012 
 
0.051 *** 0.031 *** 0.053 *** 
(0.013) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.013)     
Profit situation: sufficient/unsatisfactory (reference)             
Profit situation: (very) good 0.024 *** 0.007 
 
0.010 * 0.014 
 
0.012 
 
0.015 *   
  (0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.009)     
Profit situation: satisfactory 0.010 
 
0.003 
 
0.006 
 
0.006 
 
0.009 
 
0.007     
  (0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.009)     
No spin-offs -0.020 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.012     
  (0.017) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.017)     
Integration of other establishments 0.041 ** 0.036 * 0.024 
 
0.062 *** 0.053 *** 0.062 *** 
  (0.020) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.018)     
No R&D dept. (reference)             
R&D dept. in establishment 0.269 *** 0.105 *** 0.139 *** 0.235 *** 0.152 *** 0.222 *** 
  (0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.011)     
R&D dept. in enterprise 0.097 *** 0.004 
 
0.045 ** 0.082 *** 0.064 *** 0.085 *** 
  (0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.022)     
Individually owned -0.036 *** -0.001 
 
0.000 
 
-0.028 ** -0.017 ** -0.032 **  
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  (0.012) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.012)     
Further training 0.083 *** 0.046 *** 0.021 *** 0.092 *** 0.044 *** 0.094 *** 
  (0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008)     
Expected business volume development: increase 
(reference) 
            
Expected business volume development: unchanged 
 
-0.046 *** -0.041 *** -0.012 ** -0.052 *** -0.025 *** -0.053 *** 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007)     
Expected business volume development: decrease  
-0.057 *** -0.039 *** -0.012 ** -0.054 *** -0.021 *** -0.047 *** 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009)     
State of the technical equipment: state-of-the-art 
(reference) 
            
State of the technical equipment: rather new -0.028 *** -0.020 ** -0.021 *** -0.022 ** -0.058 *** -0.03 *** 
  (0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009)     
State of the technical equipment: medium or worse 
  
-0.065 *** -0.033 *** -0.032 *** -0.051 *** -0.091 *** -0.061 *** 
(0.011) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.01)     
Share of part-time workers -0.000 
 
0.000 ** 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
0.000     
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
Share of fixed-term contract workers 0.001 ** 0.001 * 0.000 * 0.001 ** 0.000 
 
0.001 **  
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
Share of high-skilled workers 0.002 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 
 
0.001 *** 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
Single-establishment -0.019 * -0.049 *** -0.020 *** -0.031 *** -0.029 *** -0.031 *** 
  (0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.01)     
Foreign ownership -0.001 
 
-0.044 *** -0.024 ** -0.017 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.023 *   
  (0.015) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.014)     
Western Germany 0.078 *** 0.020 ** 0.007 
 
0.069 *** 0.054 *** 0.073 *** 
  (0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.009)     
Share of exports 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.005 *** 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001)     
Share of exports squared 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
Share of expansion-investment 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
Constant 0.335 *** 0.171 *** 0.051 *** 0.377 *** 0.174 *** 0.396 *** 
  (0.029) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.029)     
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Time dummies yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Yes 
 Size dummies yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes     
Industry dummies yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 R
2
 0.21 
 
0.08 
 
0.10 
 
0.19 
 
0.16 
 
0.19 
 
Number of establishments 9,093 
 
9,095 
 
9,094 
 
9,095 
 
9,090 
 
9,094 
 
Number of observations 26,476 
 
26,485 
 
26,482 
 
26,477 
 
26,468 
 
26,478 
 
Notes: Clustered (by establishment) standard errors in parentheses. The model specification is given by equation (1) in the text. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
REASONS FOR AN ESTABLISHMENT NOT IMPLEMENTING INNOVATION PLANS BY COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AND WORKS COUNCIL REGIME, 2008, 2010, AND 2010 (IN PERCENT) 
 
High 
investment 
costs 
High 
economic 
risk 
Lack of 
sources for 
financing 
Organizational 
problems 
Shortages of 
qualIfied 
personnel 
Lack of market 
acceptance by 
customers 
Long 
licensing 
procedures 
Other N 
2008          
Sectoral 
agreement 
52.0 29.1 13.4 25.7 16.2 8.4 11.2 17.9 179 
No sectoral 
agreement 
43.6 35.5 20.4 24.6 19.9 11.4 12.3 17.1 211 
t-test          
          
Works 
council 
53.9 25.4 11.9 27.5 13.0 10.9 12.4 19.7 193 
No works 
council 
43.4 38.1 20.5 25.4 21.3 10.2 13.9 14.3 244 
t-test 
Ho 
rejected 
Ho 
rejected 
Ho 
rejected 
 
Ho 
rejected 
    
          
2010 
         
sectoral 
agreement 
45.2 27.1 12.4 32.8 20.3 7.3 12.4 18.6 177 
No sectoral 
agreement 
41.0 27.1 16.6 28.6 22.3 7.5 12.7 18.4 332 
t-test          
          
Works 
council 
47.4 26.7 12.9 27.6 19.4 8.2 12.9 19.4 232 
No works 
council 
40.8 27.2 17.1 29.8 22.3 6.4 12.4 17.3 346 
t-test          
          
2012 
         
sectoral 
agreement 
42.5 24.1 6.9 35.1 20.1 10.3 13.2 22.4 174 
No sectoral 
agreement 
38.5 25.2 14.3 39.1 23.0 6.5 17.1 14.3 322 
t-test   
Ho 
rejected 
  Ho rejected    
          
Works 
council 
43.5 22.6 7.4 34.3 22.6 9.6 15.2 20.0 230 
No works 
council 
37.8 25.3 13.8 39.7 23.1 6.3 14.7 15.6 320 
t-test   
Ho 
rejected 
      
Notes: The top cell in the first column indicates that 52.0 percent of all establishments covered by a 
sectoral agreement that have not implemented their innovation plans responded that their high cost 
was a reason for not activating them. The reported results are based on questions referring to the 
previous business year, meaning that they were actually obtained using the 2009, 2011, and 2013 
IAB surveys. t-test denotes the mean comparison test, with the null given by the no difference in the 
mean. 
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TABLE 6 
SECTORAL AGREEMENT AND WORKS COUNCIL ANNUAL TRANSITIONS (IN PERCENT)  
  2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 Average 
a) Sectoral agreement transitions 
0->0 48.9 49.5 54.0 57.6 58.4 58.8 54.5 
0->1 5.0 4.3 1.5 1.3 2.1 1.7 2.7 
1->1 41.5 41.3 41.1 38.9 37.6 36.7 39.5 
1->0 4.7 4.9 3.4 2.2 1.9 2.7 3.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
b) Works council transitions 
0->0 65.4 66.2 66.6 68.7 68.7 69.0 67.4 
0->1 1.0 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 
1->1 32.2 31.3 31.4 29.8 29.7 29.7 30.7 
1->0 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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TABLE 7 
WORKS COUNCIL TRANSITIONS OF SECTORAL AGREEMENT JOINERS AND LEAVERS BY YEAR (IN 
PERCENT) 
 
 Year of works council introduction or abandonment 
 In the same year 1-year after 2-years after 3-years after 4-years after 5-years after 
scb_joiner (0-1)            
2007-2008 joiner 3.6 2.7 3.7 2.4 0.0 1.6 
2008-2009 joiner 3.9 1.6 1.2 0.0 0.0  
2009-2010 joiner 7.5 6.2 0.0 2.1   
2010-2011 joiner 2.8 0.0 0.0    
2011-2012 joiner 0.9 1.2     
2012-2013 joiner 3.2      
  3.6 2.3 1.2 1.5 0.0 1.6 
scb_leaver (1-0) 
 
     
2007-2008 leaver 4.2 3.4 2.4 1.4 0.8 0.0 
2008-2009 leaver 3.0 2.7 3.0 0.6 1.3  
2009-2010 leaver 3.2 0.0 0.8 0.0   
2010-2011 leaver 2.6 1.0 1.1    
2011-2012 leaver 1.0 0.0     
2012-2013 leaver 1.3      
 
2.6 1.4 1.8 0.6 1.1 0.0 
Notes: The percentage value reported in the top left cell (i.e. 4 percent) is obtained by dividing the 10 
works council joiners by 276, which is the total number of sectoral agreement joiners that are 
observed in both 2007 and 2008. The value in the adjacent cell in the same row (i.e. 3 percent) is 
obtained dividing 6 by 217. The latter number subtracts the 59 (i.e. 276 - 217) establishments that 
were rotated out of the panel in the 2009 survey.  
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TABLE 8 
SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE RECURSIVE MULTIVARIATE PROBIT MODEL  
  
  
Sectoral 
agreement (first 
equation) 
Works council 
(second equation) 
Innovation (Any type) (third equation) 
Alternative 1: 
without an 
interaction term 
Alternative 2:  
with an 
interaction term 
Sectoral agreement 
---------   0.58 *** -0.05   -0.12 ** 
    (0.07)   (0.53)   (0.055)   
Works council 
---------   ---------   0.09 ** -0.03   
        (0.047)   (0.05)   
Interaction term: sectoral 
agreement-works council 
---------   ---------   ---------   0.22 *** 
             (0.04)   
                  
𝜌21 
 
0.04   0.04   0.04   0.04   
(0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)   
𝜌31 
 
-0.05   -0.05   -0.05   -0.02   
(0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   
𝜌32 
 
-0.02   -0.02   -0.02   -0.01   
(0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   
Log likelihood -32,191.44   -32,191.44   -32,191.44   -32,178.36   
N 21,777   21,777   21,777   21,777   
                  
Linear prediction 
0.34   0.87   0.23   0.23   
(0.06)   (0.09)   (0.07)   (0.07)   
Marginal success probability 0.39   0.3   0.57   0.57   
Joint probability  
Pr(depvar_j = 1) for j=1, 2, 3) 
0.11   0.11   0.11   0.11   
Joint probability 
Pr(depvar_j = 0) for j=1, 2, 3 
0.22   0.22   0.22   0.22   
Notes: Each equation j in the system described in model (2) in the text includes a set 𝐾𝑗 of assumed 
exogenous regressors dated in year t-1 (i.e. lagged one year). The null hypothesis of 𝜌21 = 𝜌31 =
𝜌32 = 0 is not rejected at conventional levels as the chi-square statistic of the corresponding 
likelihood ratio test is equal to 1.74 (p-value=0.63) and to 1.24 (p-value=0.75) in Alternative 1 and 
Alternative 2, respectively.  𝜌𝑗𝑘 , 𝑗, 𝑘 = 1,2,3, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, denotes the correlation between the residuals 
in the jth and kth equations in the system.  The fourth column presents just the coefficients of the 
third equation of the recursive system in which an sectoral agreement-works council interaction term 
is added to the righ-hand-side of the innovation equation. All the results were obtained using the 
mvprobit procedure available in Stata 13. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 9 
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF INNOVATION IN GERMANY WITH SELECTIVITY TERMS, ALL ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIVE 
EMPLOYEES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 2007-2012 
  Incremental   Imitation   Radical   Product   Process   Any type   
No collective agreement-no works council (reference)                         
No sectoral agreement-works council 0.019 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.034 ** 0.019 
 
0.008 
 
0.018     
  (0.024) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022)     
Sectoral agreement-no works council -0.047 *** -0.007 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.037 ** -0.026 ** -0.038 **  
  (0.015) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.015)     
Sectoral agreement-works council 0.061 *** -0.011 
 
-0.005 
 
0.047 ** 0.039 ** 0.042 **  
  (0.020) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.019)     
Works council’s selectivity term -0.030 * 0.022 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.027 
 
0.014 
 
-0.027     
  (0.017) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.017)     
Sectoral agreement‘s selectivity term 0.102 *** 0.016 
 
0.008 
 
0.096 *** 0.007 
 
0.105 *** 
  (0.030) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.029)     
No/minor pressure (reference) 
            
Pressure: medium 0.027 * 0.022 
 
0.014 
 
0.034 ** 0.021 * 0.044 *** 
  (0.015) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.015)     
Pressure: substantial, which doesn't endanger the 
continued existence   
0.061 *** 0.056 *** 0.021 ** 0.062 *** 0.056 *** 0.072 *** 
(0.016) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.016)     
Pressure: substantial, which endanger the continued 
existence  
0.030 
 
0.054 *** 0.005 
 
0.041 ** 0.033 ** 0.037 *   
(0.019) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.019)     
Profit situation: sufficient/unsatisfactory (reference) 
            
Profit situation: (very) good 0.005 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.004     
  (0.014) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.013)     
Profit situation: satisfactory 0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.001 
 
0.005 
 
0.001     
  (0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.013)     
No spin-offs -0.016 
 
0.024 
 
0.013 
 
0.003 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.006     
  (0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.027)     
Integration of other establishments 0.078 ** 0.003 
 
0.033 
 
0.087 *** 0.049 
 
0.083 *** 
  (0.033) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.031)     
No R&D dept. (reference)  
            
R&D dept. in establishment 0.262 *** 0.108 *** 0.141 *** 0.238 *** 0.126 *** 0.226 *** 
  (0.017) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.016)     
51 
 
 
 
R&D dept. in enterprise 0.127 *** 0.011 
 
0.063 ** 0.113 *** 0.090 *** 0.116 *** 
  (0.037) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.036)     
Individually owned 0.007 
 
-0.011 
 
0.001 
 
0.008 
 
-0.036 * 0.006     
  (0.024) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.025)     
Further training 0.081 *** 0.046 *** 0.026 *** 0.093 *** 0.042 *** 0.098 *** 
  (0.012) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.012)     
Expected business volume development: increase 
(reference)             
Expected business volume development: unchanged  
-0.048 *** -0.033 *** -0.015 ** -0.055 *** -0.019 ** -0.057 *** 
(0.011) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011)     
Expected business volume development: decrease  
-0.068 *** -0.038 *** -0.013 
 
-0.066 *** -0.009 
 
-0.058 *** 
(0.013) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.013)     
State of the technical equipment: state-of-the-art 
(reference)             
State of the technical equipment: rather new -0.041 *** -0.027 ** -0.030 *** -0.031 ** -0.076 *** -0.041 *** 
  (0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013)     
State of the technical equipment: medium or worse  
-0.077 *** -0.042 *** -0.048 *** -0.064 *** -0.121 *** -0.077 *** 
(0.016) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.015)     
Share of part-time workers -0.000 
 
0.001 * -0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000     
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
Share of fixed-term contract workers 0.001 
 
0.001 * 0.000 
 
0.001 * 0.000 
 
0.001 *   
  (0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001)     
Share of high-skilled workers 0.001 * 0.000 
 
0.001 *** 0.001 * 0.000 
 
0.001     
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
Single-establishment -0.041 *** -0.069 *** -0.021 ** -0.052 *** -0.041 *** -0.055 *** 
  (0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.015)     
Foreign ownership 0.007 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.005 
 
0.007 
 
-0.012     
  (0.021) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.020)     
Western Germany 0.106 *** 0.042 *** 0.008 
 
0.095 *** 0.057 *** 0.106 *** 
  (0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.016)     
Share of exports 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.002 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 
  (0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001)     
Share of exports squared -0.000 *** -0.000 *** -0.000 *** -0.000 *** -0.000 *** -0.000 *** 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
Share of expansion investment 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 
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  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
Constant 0.261 *** 0.084  0.044  0.283 *** 0.183 *** 0.297 *** 
 (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.044)  (0.063)  (0.058)  (0.063)     
Time dummies yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Size dummies yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Industry dummies yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
R
2
 0.22 
 
0.09 
 
0.10 
 
0.20 
 
0.16 
 
0.21 
 
Number of establishments 4,867 
 
4,867 
 
4,866 
 
4,866 
 
4,866 
 
4,866 
 
Number of observations 11,527 
 
11,528 
 
11,527 
 
11,526 
 
11,526 
 
11,529 
 
Notes:  Clustered (by establishment) standard errors in parentheses. The model specification is given by equation (3) in the text, with the two selectivity terms 
for the presence of works council and sectoral agreement being derived from a biprobit that uses a non-common set of regressors in the corresponding choice 
equations. (See text for the description of the procedure.) The null of no interdependence between the two equations in the biprobit is rejected comfortabaly 
at the 0.01 level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 10  
THE SELECTION OF SUBSAMPLES 
 Subsample 
[Given by the sectoral 
bargaining and 
innovation status in t0 
(i.e. 2007-2008)] 
Sectoral 
bargaining status 
in t1 [i.e. 2009-
2010] 
Outcome 
Innovation in t1 
[i.e. 2009-2010] 
Interpretation 
 A positive coefficient on 
the scb variable means 
that: 
Case 1 Establishments that are 
both non-innovators 
and not covered by a 
sectoral agreement; 
that is, 
Innov=0 in both 2007 
and 2008 
scb=0 in both 2007 and 
2008 
1/0 dummy  
(1 if scb=1 in both 
2009 and 2010); 0 
if scb=0 in both 
2009 and 2010) 
1/0 dummy 
(1 if Innov=1 in 
either 2009 or 
2010, or in both; 
0 otherwise) 
 
Joining a sectoral 
agreement increases the 
probability of innovation 
for plant without any 
innovation at all in t0 
Case 2 Establishments that are 
both non-innovators 
and covered by a 
sectoral agreement; 
that is, 
Innov=0 in both 2007 
and 2008 
scb=1 in both 2007 and 
2008 
1/0 dummy  
(1 if scb=0 in both 
2009 and 2010); 0 
if scb=1 in both 
2009 and 2010) 
1/0 dummy 
(1 if Innov=1 in 
either 2009 or 
2010, or in both 
years; 0 
otherwise) 
 
Leaving sectoral 
agreement decreases 
the probability of 
innovation for plant 
without any innovation 
at all in t0 
Case 3 Establishments that are 
both innovators and not 
covered by a sectoral 
agreement; 
that is, 
Innov=1 in either 2007 
and 2008 (or in both) 
scb=0 in both 2007 and 
2008 
1/0 dummy  
(1 if scb=1 in both 
2009 and 2010); 0 
if scb=0 in both 
2009 and 2010) 
1/0 dummy 
(1 if Innov=1 in 
either 2009 or 
2010, or in both 
years; 0 
otherwise) 
 
Joining a sectoral 
agreement increases the 
probability of innovation 
for plant with some 
innovation in t0 
Case 4 Establishments that are 
both innovators and 
covered by a sectoral 
agreement, that is, 
Innov=1 in either 2007 
and 2008 (or in both 
years) 
scb=1 in both 2007 and 
2008 
1/0 dummy  
(1 if scb=0 in both 
2009 and 2010); 0 
if scb=1 in both 
2009 and 2010) 
 
1/0 dummy 
(1 if Innov=1 in 
either 2009 or 
2010, or in both 
years; 0 
otherwise) 
 
Leaving sectoral 
agreement increases the 
probability of innovation 
for plant with some 
innovation in t0 
Note: This table illustrates the case in which the selected observation window is given by t0=2007-
2008 and t1= 2009-2010. 
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TABLE 11 
THE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES EFFECT OF JOINING/LEAVING SECTORAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF ANY TYPE OF INNOVATION IN GERMANY, FOR INNOVATING 
AND NON-INNOVATING ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIVE EMPLOYEES, PRIVATE SECTOR, 2007-
2012, POOLED CASE 
 
(a) Non-innovators sample 
       
  
Without woco (in 𝑡0) With woco (in 𝑡0) 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Scb coefficient 
 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 0.09*** 0.09** 
Works council’s 
selectivity term 
---------- 56.80* ---------- -0.27 ---------- -0.33 
Sectoral agreement's 
selectivity term 
---------- -1.73 ---------- 0.4 ---------- 1.80 *** 
R
2
 0.57 0.61 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.05 
N 82 82 520 520 3,914 3,914 
 
(b) Innovators sample 
   
  
Without works council (in 𝑡0) With works council (in 𝑡0) 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
scb coefficient -0.43** -0.43* 0.09 0.10 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.004 
works council’s 
selectivity term 
---------- 3.55 ---------- 34.69 ---------- -0.73 ---------- 1.63 
sectoral agreement‘s 
selectivity term 
---------- 2.12 ---------- 0.81 ---------- 0.03 ---------- 0.19 
R
2
 0.72 0.73 0.32 0.33 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 
N 58 58 154 154 1,146 1,146 9,498 9,498 
Notes: In each panel, the reported coefficients are obtained by running a linear probability model. 
Both the dependent variable – any type of innovation – and the sectoral collective bargaining 
agreement variable are dated in 𝑡1. The control variables are in first differences. See Table 10 for full 
details on model implementation and interpretation. No estimates could be obtained for the joining 
scb vs. staying uncovered case in panel (a). Similarly to the implementation in Table 9, the selectivity 
terms are derived from a biprobit that models now the works council and sectoral agreement 
switching decisions. The null of no interdependence across the two equations in the biprobit is 
always rejected at the 0.01 level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 12 
 THE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES EFFECT OF JOINING/LEAVING SECTORAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF ANY TYPE OF INNOVATION IN GERMANY, FOR INNOVATING 
AND NON-INNOVATING ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIVE EMPLOYEES, PRIVATE SECTOR, 2007-
2012, POOLED CASE WITH NO WORKS COUNCIL SWITCHERS 
  
Non-innovator Innovator 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Scb coefficient -0.09 
 
0.09*** 0.09*** -0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.001 
Works council’s 
selectivity term 
---------- ---------- -0.56 ---------- -1.32 ---------- 2.40 
Sectoral agreement‘s 
selectivity term 
---------- ---------- 1.11 ---------- 0.15 ---------- -0.40 
Works council (in 𝑡0) 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.06* -0.06* 
R
2
 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 
N 518 3,905 3,905 1,162 1,162 9,403 9,403 
Notes: See notes to Table 11. No estimates could be obtained for the joining scb vs. staying 
uncovered/non-innovator case in the second column.  The selectivity terms are derived from a 
biprobit that models, respectively, works council presence and sectoral agreement transitions. The 
null of no interdependence across the two equations in the biprobit is always rejected at the 0.01 
level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 13 
MEDIUM-TO LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF JOINING/LEAVING SECTORAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF ANY TYPE OF INNOVATION IN GERMANY, FOR INNOVATING 
AND NON-INNOVATING ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIVE EMPLOYEES, PRIVATE SECTOR, 2007-
2012 
 
(a) Non-innovators sample  
 
Without works council With works council 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Scb coefficient 0.16 0.17 
  R
2
 0.14 0.19 
N 310 188 
 
(b) Innovators sample 
 
Without works council With works council 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Scb coefficient 0.14 -0.04 0.16 -0.38*** 
R
2
 0.09 0.21 0.24 0.23 
N 644 229 107 301 
Notes:  The pre-treatment period 𝑡0 comprises the 2007-08 interval; 𝑡1=2009-12 is the post-
treatment period. No estimates could be obtained for the last two columns in panel (a). See the text 
for a full description of the experiment. 
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TABLE 14 
THE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES EFFECTS USING PLACEBOS  
 
(a) Non-innovators sample  
 
Without works council With works council 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
scb coefficient 0.49** -0.16 
 
-0.32 
R
2
 0.14 0.24 0.45 
N 388 242 92 
 
 
(b) Innovators sample 
 
Without works council With works council 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
Joining scb 
vs. 
Staying uncovered 
Leaving scb 
vs. 
Staying covered 
scb coefficient 0.15 0.09 0.26 -0.06 
R
2
 0.13 0.23 0.33 0.16 
N 848 290 153 427 
Note:  See the text for a full description of the experiment. No estimates could be obtained for the 
third column in panel (a). 
  
 
 
